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HENRI THEIL
NETHERLANDS SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS •ECONOMETRICINSTITUTE
Private firms, especially large ones, usually have sizable central planning
departments. Western governments, although their economic problems are
more weighty and complex, do not generally employ such assistance. One
finds when traveling through the administrative centers of Western
countries only small staffs, at scattered locations. One reason may be the
idea that looking into the future in a comprehensive, consistent, and
centralized fashion is close to socialist planning. Another may be that our
knowledge of the mechanism of economic systems is still so primitive that
the economist's advice is not always of value.
The situation is slightly different in the Netherlands. After World War
lithe Central Planning Bureau was established. It now has some ninety
employees, half of them graduate economists.1 One of its tasks is to supply
a system of coherent forecasts of the development of certain macro-
economic variables in the next year (the annual "Central Economic
Plan"), including predictions based on alternative government policies.
The tool employed is an econometric equation system. The Plan 1955,
for example, was based on a system of 27 linear (or linearized) relations of
which 11 were behavior relations; 4, institutional relations; and 12,
definitions. There were two consumption functions, one for wage income
and one for nonwage income. The endogenous variables included price
indexes as well as volumes and values. The price indexes (of consumption
goods, investment goods, etc.) were described as functions of the wage
level and the import price level, the latter two variables being considered
as exogenous.2
In the following section I shall evaluate briefly the accuracy of recent
Dutch predictions.3 I shall then proceed to the problem of decision-making
by means of econometric models.
IFora description of the activities of the Bureau in comparison with similar operations
carried out in the United Kingdom, see R. L. Marris, "The Position of Economics and
Economists in the Government Machine: A Comparative Critique of the United
Kingdom and the Netherlands," Economic Journal, December 1954, pp. 759-783.
2Theequation system in its complete form has been published in the Centraal
Economisch Plan 1955, The Hague, 1955, pp. 110-119.
See also my "A Statistical Appraisal of Postwar Macroeconomic Forecasts in the
Netherlands and Scandinavia," a paper read at the Rio de Janeiro Meeting of the
International Statistical Institute (1955). This paper will be published in the Proceedings
of the Meeting.
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Measuring the A ccuracy of the Dutch Model Predictions
INTRODUCTION
The analysis of the accuracy of forecasts must be distinguished carefully
from a verification of the forecasting procedure. In point predictions (in
contrast with interval predictions), a forecasting procedure is a method of
deriving predictions with the following properties: the forecasting errors
have a zero mean, or a zero median, or a zero upper quartile, and so forth.
Verification amounts then to a statistical test of the null hypothesis that the
observed prediction errors are drawings from a parent characterized by
such properties, against some specified alternative hypothesis. Clearly,
verification is possible only if the forecaster states explicitly what kind of
probability properties his errors are supposed to have. For the Dutch
macroeconomic forecasts this is not the case. Nor are probability prop-
erties of the disturbances of the equation system, like variances and
covariances, specified explicitly. Accuracy analysis, on the other hand,
does not require probability assumptions since it is concerned with the
empirical variation of the forecasts around the "actual" quantities which
they serve to predict.
This section is devoted to an accuracy analysis of the Dutch forecasts.
Such an analysis can be carried out at three distinct levels:
1. The forecast values are taken as given and are compared with the
corresponding actual values. This is a straightforward approach, which,
unlike 2 and 3 below, can be applied irrespective of the existence of an
equation system.
2. The exogenous variables are separated from the endogenous ones,
and the observed values of the former are inserted in the equation system.
The corresponding values of the endogenous variables are then derived
and compared with the observed endogenous values. (The forecast here is
conditional upon the exogenous variables being as observed.)
3. For each (structural) equation of the model, the variable explained
is separated from the explanatory variables, and the observed values
taken by the latter are inserted in the equation. The corresponding com-
puted value of the variable explained is then compared with the observed
value. For example, if the equation system contains a function describing
consumption as dependent on income, prices, and other exogenous and
endogenous variables, then the values taken by the latter variables deter-
mine a certain consumption figure, which can be compared with the
observed amount in order to judge the accuracy of the consumption
function.
My analysis here will be confined to approaches 1 and 2.
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ON THE ACCURACY OF THE UNCONDITIONAL FORECASTS
The analysis is based on the development of twenty-three variables from
1949 through 1955, 1952 being excluded.4 A summarizing picture of all
pairs of forecasts and corresponding observed changes is given in Chart 1.
Predicted (percentage) changes are defined as
(1) P = 100
a1'-1
CHART I
Comparison of Actual and Predicted Percentage Changes,
A-I.
23 Variables, 1949—1955, Excluding 1952
(predicted values taken as given)
whereis the predicted level of some variable in yeart and the
actual level of the preceding year as it was known when the forecastwas
made. The latter value is to be distinguished froma1—1, which is the actual
4For1952, alternative forecasts were prepared, a fact which hampers a satisfactory
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level in 1— 1 according to later statistical data. This level is used in the




The distinction between a,'—1 and a,—1 removes the disturbing effect of
imperfect statistical knowledge of the preceding year, which is desirable
because this imperfection has nothing to do with the quality of predictions
for the next year.
Chart 1 shows that the majority of the points are situated in the
"correct" first and third quadrants, implying that there are relatively few
turning-point errors. But it shows also that most of the points in the first
quadrant are below the line of perfect forecast (the broken line through
the origin), which implies a bias toward underestimation of changes.
More precisely, the percentage distribution of the 134 forecasts over the
categories is as follows: turning-point errors5—12; correct-sign predictions
—88, of which 65 were underestimation of changes6 and 24 were over-
estimation of changes.
To compare these results with those obtained by two well-known
"naïve" forecasting methods—the no-change extrapolation (FE 0) and
the extrapolation of last year's change (FE A_1)—the inferiority of the
0 method is well illustrated if all points of Chart 1 are shifted vertically
until they reach the horizontal axis. While this reduces the number of
turning-point errors to zero, the picture as a whole is considerably worse.
The implications of the method FE A—1 are illustrated in Chart 2. The
distribution over turning-point errors and underestimation and over-
estimation of changes is as followsturning-point errors—20; correct-
sign predictions—80, of which 39 were underestimation of changes and
41 were overestimation of changes. Although the bias toward underestima-
tion appears to be absent, again the picture as a whole is evidently worse.
The comparisons are favorable to the Dutch forecasts but the forecasts
are far from perfect.
1. There is the bias toward underestimation of changes, which can be
formalized by the regression:
(3) P =0.7A
implying that the predictions are on the average equal to 70 per cent of the
corresponding observed changes. This regression is indicated by the solid
upward sloping line through the origin of Chart 1.
5Includingnonzero predictions of zero changes and zero predictions of nonzero
changes. The frequency of these cases is 4 per cent.
6The(rare) cases of perfect forecasts have been equally divided between under-
estimation and overestimation.
See footnotes 5 and 6.
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CHART2
Comparison of Actua' and Predicted Percentage Changes,
23 Variables, 1949—1955, Excluding
(predicted values derived from extrapolation
1952
of previous year's change)
—10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
2. The residuals around
variance. A closer inspection
regression line do not have constant
of Chart 1 suggests that the variance is
least near the origin and that it increases when we proceed in a north-
eastern or southwestern direction. This can be formalized by the "scedas-
tic" regression:
(4) (P—O.7A)2 =10+ 0. 1A2
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which describes the forecasts according to the regression (O.7A) ± the
standard deviation.8
ON THE ACCURACY OF CONDITIONAL FORECASTS
For 1949-54 an analysis of the conditional forecasts, based on approach
2, was carried out by Lips and Schouten.9 It was based upon the develop-
ment of 14 variables, of which 5 are price indexes; 5, volumes; and 4,
values; so,' as a whole, there are 84 conditional forecasts (Pc) and corre-
sponding observed changes (A). Chart 3 shows that the forecasts are
substantially better than the unconditional forecasts (Chart1). The
percentage distribution over turning-point errors and underestimation
and overestimation of changes is as follows;'0 turning-point errors—19;
correct-sign predictions—8 1, of which 44 were underestimation of changes,
and 37 were overestimation of changes.
The bias toward change underestimation is much less important than
it was for the unconditional forecasts and may not exist at all. The rather
large number of turning-point errors is partly due to the inclusion of 1952,
which was quite stable and showed minor changes relative to 1951. It also
reflects the inclusion of five price indexes (instead of the three in the analysis
of the unconditional forecasts), which were relatively stable in four of the
six years. Obviously, when small changes are involved, the danger of
turning-point errors is greater than in the case of substantial changes.
COMMENT
The unconditional forecasts, though imperfect, are not bad when com-
pared with naïve methods, and the conditional forecasts are even better.
Hence most of the errors in the unconditional predictions must be due to
erroneous predictions of future exogenous values. Furthermore, while
the unconditional forecasts show a clear tendency toward underestimation
of changes, the conditional forecasts do not. Hence there must be a similar
bias in the predictions of future exogenous values.
8Thecoefficients 0.7, 10, 0.1 of the two regressions are derived from the values for
1949-51 and 1953 in the following iterative manner. First, the median (in')ofthe
individual ratios P/A are used as a preliminary estimate of the coefficient ininthe re-
gression P= mA; next, the squares of the deviations F— m'A are grouped according to
increasing order of A and plotted in a scatter against the square of A. This yields the
values 10 and 0.1 mentioned above. The final estimate of m is obtained by taking a
weighted average of the ratio P/A, the weights being equal to A2/(10 + 0.1 A2). This is in
accordance with weighted regression theory. For an alternative approach based on the
"second regression line," see my Economic Forecasts and Policy, North—Holland, 1950.
J. Lips and D. B. J. Schouten, "The Reliability of the Policy Model of the Central
Planning Bureau," a paper read at the Hindsgavl Meeting of the International Associa-
tion for Research in Income and Wealth, 1955 (Income and Wealth Series VI, London,
Bowes and Bowes, 1957, pp. 24-51).
'°Seefootnotes 5 and 6.
34FORECASTING AND GO VERNMENT POLICY-MAKING
CHART3
Comparison of Actual and Predicted Percentage Changes
the Dutch forecasts:
14 Variables, 1949—1954
1. The scarcity of turning-point errors owed much to the scarcityof
turning points, thanks to strong upward trends for most of the variables
in most of the years studied.
2. The Central Economic Plans were sometimes published rather late
in the year to which they refer."
3. The model contains many important exogenous variables. The change
11This"advantage" should not be overestimated. If we take the preliminary forecasts
for 1949-51 and 1953 that were prepared around January (the final predictions for 1954
and 1955 were published rather early), we arrive at forty-four predictions. About 80 per
cent of them are closer to the corresponding observed changes than no-change extra-
polations, half the remainder consist of ties. Similarly, the extrapolations OA —
areworse than about 70 per cent of these forecasts.
.35
(predicted values derived by use of observed exogenous values)
But other factors contributed to the relatively good showing made byFOREC4 STING A ND GO VERNMENT POLIC Y-MA KING
in the volume of exports, for instance, is largely exogenous from the
Dutch point of view and the total amount of exports is considerable in
relation to the national product. Another such variable is the wage level.
Although the central government cannot change wages arbitrarily, it must
consent to wage increases; and this makes the wage level effectively
exogenous. Clearly, the insertion of the observed values of these variables
in the model must contribute to the quality of the conditional forecasts
of the endogenous changes.
4. The equation system underlying the conditional forecasts (that of
Plan 1955) is one of a series of successive systems which are the result of
theoretical and empirical experimentation. Although the systematic
analysis of Lips and Schouten was the first of its kind, such experimenta-
tion, too, must contribute to the quality of the conditional forecasts for
the earlier years of 1949-54.
These special features may partly explain the difference between the
findings reported here and those of Christ's analyses of the predictive
power of Klein's models of the United States economy.'2
The Use of Forecasts in Decision-Making
The exposition in this section is mainly theoretical; it is presented in
general, rather than in numerical terms. A more detailed treatment is
presented in my monograph, Economic Forecasts and Policy (North-
Holland Publishing Company, 1958). I shall confine myself to the static
variant of the theory.
Consider a policy-maker (who may or may not be government em-
ployed), who has certain instruments (x1,...•, athis disposal and who
is interested in certain noncontrolled variables (yi,..., The relation-
ship between these variables is supposed to be linear, and may be written
briefly:
(6) y =Rx+s
where x and y are column vectors of instruments and noncontrolled
variables respectively, R a n x m matrix of multiplicative coefficients, and
s a column vector of additive coefficients. The elements of the multipli-
cative structure (i.e. the elements of R) describe the effectiveness of the
various instruments for the various noncontrolled variables.
Assuming that (6) describes the relationship between instruments and
noncontrolled variables during a certain period, and that the policy-
maker must choose among alternative actions (i.e. alternative x-vectors),
12C.F. Christ, "A Test of an Econometric Model for the United States, 1921-1947,"
in ConferenceonBusiness Cycles, Special Conference 2, National Bureau of Economic
Research, 1951, pp. 35-107; also his "Aggregate Econometric Models," American
EconomicReview, June1956,pp.385-408.
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the criterion will be derived by the introduction of a preference function
which is supposed to be quadratic:
(7) w(x,y)=
Hence, in mathematical terms, the policy-maker's problem consists of
maximization of (7) subject to (6). This is largely comparable to the
consumer's problem of maximizing a utility function subject to a linear
budget constraint. However, classical demand theory ignores problems of
uncertainty, which are vitally important here, because of the role played
by predictions. Most economic models, from which reduced forms of
the type (6) are derived, contain exogenous variables not controlled by
the policy-maker. An example is the import price level in the Dutch
equation system. Such variables do not fall under x. Instead their values
have to be predicted before they are included in the vector s. Thus s is a
rather heterogeneous mixture:it includes values assumed by certain
exogenous variables and also disturbances.
The policy-maker will have in general an imperfect knowledge about
the parameter matrixes of his constraints, and especially about s. To
handle the problem in a probabilistic manner, we must assume that the
policy-maker's preferences satisfy the Von Neumann—Morgenstern axioms,
and that his preference function (7) is such that, if he is in an uncertain
situation, he maximizes expected utility.
THE LOSS OF WELFARE DUE TO SUBOPTIMAL DECISIONS
First I shall disregard all problems of uncertainty and derive the policy-
maker's "best" x (to be denoted by x°), given preferences and con-
straints. Thenisthe utility level attained when the vector x is applied:
(8) = w(x,Rx+s) =ko+k'x++x'Kx
where k0 =
aC




K being a square and symmetric matrix independent of s. Maximization
of (8) with respect to x gives
(10) =—K-'k
Comparing the parameter matrixes R and s with the parameters of the
consumer's budget constraint (i.e. with prices and income), and supposing
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that the elements of these matrixes take alternative values, we see that
(10) can be regarded as the policy-maker's analogue of the consumer's
demand functions. I shall call them the optimal reaction functions. The
corresponding functions of the noncontrolled variables (y) are found by
substituting (10) into (6). It is immediately apparent that the functions are
all linear in s. This, too, is comparable with consumer's demand theory.
For, if the utility function is quadratic, the Engel curves are all straight
lines; and these curves describe the consumer's optimal purchases as
dependent on the additive coefficient of his constraint (i.e. on his income).
If the policy-maker applies the instrument vector x°, then he arrives at
the maximal welfare level attainable:
(11) = k0_4k'K-1k
=ko—fx°'Kx°
If he applies any other instrument vector x, then the level attained is given
by (8). Subtracting (8) from (11), we find the loss of welfare due to the
suboptimal decision x:
(12) —=+[x°'Kx°'—2x°'Kx+ x'Kx]
which is a quadratic form in the decision error x —x0,the matrix of this
form being —
Kshould be a negative-definite matrix. I shall
not go into detail here, but confine myself to the following remarks. If
the generalization of consumer's demand theory is carried out consistently,
substitution and complementarity relationships can be defined in a natural
manner. In particular, there is a substitution matrix of order m + n and
rank m, containing substitution terms for all pairs of variables, instru-
ments as well as noncontrolled variables. Consider then that submatrix
of order m x m of the substitution matrix that corresponds to pairs of
instruments only. It can be shown that this submatrix is equal to the inverse
of K. Hence the matrix of the loss of welfare is determined by substitution
and complementarity relationships among instruments.
THE LOSS OF WELFARE DUE TO IMPERFECT PREDiCTIONS
The loss defined above is associated with a certain x, and is entirely
independent of how the decision is arrived at. Consider now the loss of
welfare due to imperfect forecasts. Suppose that the policy-maker's
actual constraint is given by (6), but that he thinks that his constraints are
(13) yRX+Se
If the additive structure of the constraints in the relevant period is
predicted imperfectly. Itis also possible to proceed under the more
general assumption that the multiplicative structure is known imperfectly,
38FORECASTING AND GO VERNMENT FOLIC Y-MA KiNG
so that the matrix R of (13) must be replaced by This is, however,
beyond the scope of the present paper. The special attention given to the
case Re = R can be justified by reference to the empirical finding that the
large difference between the quality of the conditional and the uncon-
ditional forecasts is due to deficiencies in the prediction of future exo-
genous values. The values, as far as they belong to noncontrolled exogenous
variables, are components of s,notof R.
If the policy-maker assumes that his constraints are given by (13), he
chooses that x which will maximize utility under these conditions. This x
is different from x0. Actually, it is not difficult to see that the resulting
decision error x—x° is only the change in x according to the optimal
reaction functions that would take place if the constraints changed from
(6) to (13). Given the linearity of these functions in s,wefind that the
decision error resulting from the prediction error s equals
(14) XX° = H(SeS)
where (cf. equations (9) and (10))
(15) H =—K-'(C+R'B)
Combining (14) with (12), we find for the loss of welfare due to the fore-




It will prove convenient in the following discussion to use a utility scale
(or loss-of-welfare scale) which is fully numerical. Given the assumption
that the Von Neumann—Morgenstern axioms are satisfied, this means that
we should define a zero and a unit. A zero has already been defined as the
loss of welfare which corresponds to a perfect forecast (Se =s). Ishall
define the unit as the loss of welfare that results from no-change extra-
polation; that is, as the loss which occurs if the policy-maker acts under
the assumption that sequalsthe additive structure of the constraints in
the preceding period, s—1. Writing the components of the additive structure
as deviations from the corresponding components of the preceding period
(so that s—1 becomes a zero vector), gives what will be called the failure
of the forecast Se:
(18) =
Thefailure is obviously zero for a perfect forecast,'3 one for a no-change
13Thefailure can also be zero for particular imperfect forecasts since F may be
semi-definite, e.g. if m <n(fewer instruments than noncontrolled variables). In that case
a class of vectors s exist of which the errors Sc— s"compensate" each other in such
a way that they do not affect the choice for x.
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extrapolation, and it has no finite upper limit. Similarly, the success of a
forecast is defined as the excess of the welfare level attained over the level
corresponding to the no-change extrapolation, measured in the same unit:
(19) SUCSe =1—failSe
The success is one if the forecast is perfect, zero if it is a no-change
extrapolation, and it can take negative values.
The justification of the definitions is threefold.
I. The policy-maker is always able to keep failure and success between
zero and one, provided his information is of sufficient quality and pro-
vided that the multiplicative structure of the preceding period is known
(for then he can derive as Y—i —R—1x_1, the —1indexes being inter-
preted as referring to the previous period).
2. They are related to the comparison with naïve forecasting methods.
3. They can be easily brought in connection with the bias toward
underestimation of changes.
To grasp the last assertion, consider the simple case in which the changes
in all components of the additive structure are proportionally under-
estimated. Since I wrote s—1 =0, this assumption implies
(20) =(l—O)s
0 being a scalar in the interval (0, 1). If for 0 the average mentioned for
the Dutch forecasts (30 per cent) is taken and combined with (20) and (18),
the result is a failure of 0.09 and hence a success of 0.91; a result indepen-
dent of the numerical characteristics of the policy-maker's constraints
as well as of those of his preferences.
THE POSSIBILITY OF A NEGATIVE PARENT SUCCESS
The picture of the Dutch forecasts presented here is too favorable.
When the underestimation of changes is not proportionate, the success is
reduced. I shall discuss in particular the pattern of errors which was
observed in the unconditional forecasts and also the success of the fore-
casts in a statistical population rather than in some specified case.
Suppose that the change in the additive structure (s—s—1 =s—0=s)
consists of a systematic part (g) and a stochastic part (u):
(21) -
Thestochastic part is supposed to have a zero mean and a finite covariance
matrix which is independent of the instruments:
(22) Eu =0E(uu') independent of x
Perfect forecasting of the additive structure of the constraints implies
40FORECASTING AND GOVERNMENT POLICY-MAKING
perfection with respect to bothandu, but I shall not make this assump-
tion. Instead, I shall write for the predicted additive structure
(23) Se =




— an U— E(u'Fu)
Given these fl-definitions, the relation (23) is merely a definition of the
vector v. I shall call the elements of this vector "forecast disturbances"
since (23) can be regarded as a parent regression of Seonand u, provided
that the elements of these three vectors are interpreted as "observations"
on three "variables." Another proviso is that we interpret this regression
in the sense of Aitken's method of generalized least-squares, the inverse
of the residual covariance matrix of this method being replaced by the
positive-definite (or semi-definite) matrix —F.
The relevance of (23) can be shown as follows. If O<fl5< 1, then the
change in the additive structure, as far as its systematic component is
concerned, can be said to be underestimated. If 1,the forecast is
imperfect for the stochastic component. If nothing is achieved in
this respect—which will be frequently true. As to the forecast disturbances
v, they make it possible to take account of the hyperbolic standard
deviations of the residuals around the empirical regression developed in
the analysis of unconditional forecasts. Assume:
(25) E(v'Fv) =
h3andbeing fixed positive scalars. The second term on the right can
be regarded as a constant, given the assumption that the covariance
matrix of the stochastic component u is independent of the instruments;
compare (22). Hence (25) describes the expectation of a quadratic form
in the forecast disturbances as a general linear function of the same
quadratic form in the elements of the systematic part of the additive
structure of the constraints. If we compare the forecast disturbances v
with the residuals P—O.7A and recall that their squares can be approxi-
mately described as linearly dependent on A2, we see that assumption (25)
is closely related to this empirical result.
Next I shall introduce the concepts of failure and success in a parent
population. They are obtained by replacing sample moments by corre-
sponding parent moments, and will be indicated by "Fail" and "Sue,"
respectively:
•1 E[(5e5)'F(SeS)] 1L' 1 uali
— E('F) 1,uc 5e — Se
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Then, using (21)—(25), we find after some algebraic rearrangements:
(27) Suc=
where
(28) p = andq =l—p
The interpretation of this result is as follows. If the systematic part
ofthe change in the additive structure of the constraints is sufficiently
large compared with the stochastic variation of u, then p is close to one
and q close to zero. In that case (27) becomes effectively
(29) Sucse =
which means that the prediction achievements for u are then irrelevant.
The maximum of (29), given h5, is reached for= 1;and this maximal
value equals 1 —h5, which will generally be positive. If, on the other hand,
is a vector of sufficiently small elements, (27) becomes approximately
(30) SUCSe =
Here everything depends on the forecaster's achievements for the random
component u. If he is unable to achieve anything in this direction (i.e. if
then the success takes a negative value (—he). This means that the
policy-maker should not use his forecast Seatall. He should act under the
assumption of a zero change in the additive structure, in which case his
success is zero. This does not mean that he should take no measures.
Since the adaptation of his instruments at the beginning of the preceding
period will in general have been suboptimal owing to prediction errors
for that period he should adapt the instruments to the correct additive
structure of the previous period. He should, however, disregard his ideas
about the additive structure of the new period, for this would lead to a
larger loss—not necessarily in a particular sample case, but in the parent
population of such cases.
ISOLATED REDUCTIONS OF PREDICTION ERRORS
Quite frequently a forecaster is advised to revise his prediction in a
particular direction. For example, he may be advised to change the first
element of the predicted additive structure Se.Itmight seem that this advice
should be adopted if it brings the element closer to the corresponding
component of the additive structure s, but this is not necessarily true. To
see this, consider the numerator of the failure of Se:(Se — S)'F(Se—s).If
the failure matrix Fis diagonal, the numerator is a weighted sum of squares
of the forecasting error of the additive structure, the weights all having
the same sign. Then a numerical reduction of any component of Sc— S is
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sign. For the alternative case, in which the failure matrix is not diagonal,




Take further the forecasting error SeS{ll}. The numerator of the
failure of Seisthen equal to 0.2, apart from sign. Suppose also that it is
suggested that the forecast of the second component of s be changed from
1 to a. The numerator of the failure becomes then (apart from sign):
1— 1.8a+a2, the minimum of which is 0.19, which is reached at a=0.9;
and it exceeds the level 0.2 mentioned above whenever a is outside the
interval (0.8, 1). Clearly, the non-diagonality of F implies that the elimina-
tion of the second component of the prediction error is far from desirable.
Replacing Sc— s={ 11) by {1O} increases the failure fivefold! This holds
more generally. If the failure matrix is not of the diagonal type (and there
is no reason why it should be), a reduction of one particular component
of the prediction error Se— s,the other components remaining the same,
does not necessarily lead to a failure reduction. It may be that it is better
to raise the component than to reduce it. In the above example, if the
original error equals{l4},thefailure is reduced by raising the
second component to the 0.9 level, given the value 1 of the first compo-
nent. The reason is that if F is not diagonal, the components of the error
Sc —smay compensate each other via their influence on the decision error.
COMMENT
JOHN W. LEHMAN AND JAMES W. KNOWLES, Joint Economic Committee
The opportunity to review Henri Theil's paper is particularly welcome
in view of the constant concern of the staff of the Joint Economic Com-
mittee with the problems with which he deals. Judging from his paper,
work on the day-to-day difficulties of forecasting in relation to govern-
ment policy-making results in professional thinking along similar lines,
regardless of country. Our own experience provides the basis for our
comment on Theil's analysis.
ON THE THEIL PAPER
Theil prefaces his discussion of the Dutch forecasts with the observation
that most Western governments rely on small, scattered staffs to make
forecasts. In the sense that many of the analytical personnel are dispersed
among numerous operating agencies, this is true of our own government
—though our Committee staff numbers from eleven to thirteen and the
NOTE:Theviews expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent
the views of the Joint Economic Committee or individual members of that Committee.
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staff of the Council of Economic Advisers from thirty to fifty, which is
not small considering the methods of operation. However, the reasons
Theil adduces for decentralization do not apply here. The collection and
processing of the basic data, as well as the formulation of detailed oper-
ating programs, take place in the various departments and agencies. By
being on the spot, individual technicians working on different aspects of
the policy problems acquire a more intimate knowledge of the basic
procedures.
One method Theil uses to determine the accuracy of the Dutch projec-
tions is to compare the forecast values with the corresponding observed
values. He defines the former in terms of predicted percentage changes
from the actual level of the preceding year as it was known when the fore-
cast was made. The actual values employed are percentage changes com-
puted in the light of later data, both for the preceding year and for the
forecast year. He states that this "removes the disturbing effect of im-
perfect statistical knowledge of the preceding year, which is desirable
because this imperfection has nothing to do with the quality of predictions
for the next year."
Theil is correct that the forecaster's imperfect knowledge of the base
year needs to be taken into account, but his assumption that it has nothing
to do with the quality of the forecast is open to serious challenge. For
example, there may be several "actual" values as successive revisions are
made in the data, so that the result obtained by his method will depend in
part on how much time has elapsed between the making of the forecast
and the evaluation of its accuracy. More important is the fact that Theil's
method of adjustment will yield valid results only under the following
rather restricted conditions:
1. The definition of the predicted and actual values as percentage
changes must be logically consistent with the structure of the model and
with its variables; that is, the predictions must actually have been expressed
in this manner. Some complex variables are not readily definable as pre-
dicted percentage changes. The predicted figure of government expendi-
tures, for example, is a budgeted sum resting on assumptions that would
not necessarily have been altered even if a different estimate of the actual
figure for the preceding year had been available. For the net change in
investment—especially in inventories—the predicted value is the arith-
metical difference between the beginning and ending values of the net
stock of investment goods, but it is actually projected in terms of changes
in gross values and changes in prices and depreciation or capital con-
sumption.
2. The statistical data system must remain substantially unchanged in
all of its detail between the time that the actual value for the preceding
year is estimated as a basis for the forecast and the time at which the
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evaluation is carried out. Otherwise, a different percentage change may
occur simply because of a change in the data system.
3. Possible changes in the data system must not have been allowed for
in the preparation of the forecast.
4. The predictions must not be affected by any difference that arises
between the estimate of each variable for the preceding year available when
the forecast was made and the estimate available when the forecast is
appraised. Frequently this will not be true. For example, when stock and
flow variables such as gross inventories, change in inventories, sales, and
output are explicitly or implicitly incorporated into the system, a difference
in the estimate of the initial values might result in a significantly different
forecast.
5.Theforecast is adjusted for the estimated effects of predicted changes
in policies resulting from the forecast.
It is not clear to us that these conditions are met by the forecasts Theil
evaluates.
We also question whether the forecasting qualities of an equation
system can be tested by comparing its predictions with the predictions
yielded by some "naïve" forecasting method. A naïve model is one
selected in a specific instance without regard to its adaptability to the task
at hand. No method is inherently naïve.' Hence, a comparison of the type
made by Theil may be quite inconclusive unless the method selected is
naïve from the standpoint of the forecasting problems involved.
Perhaps a more important consideration is whether Theil actually
confronts his model with a test of its crucial requirements in comparison
with the performance of such a naïve model. If the Dutch model is sup-
posed to produce only estimates of the magnitude of change when all the
variables are continuing in the same direction, one should ask whether
any simple alternative gives equal or better results. This is similar to part
of the test Theil made. In approximately 20 per cent of the cases his model
is about equal in effectiveness to the method which projects the percentage
change of the previous year. The other 80 per cent of the cases are fairly
evenly distributed between those in which the complex set of equations
gives poorer results and those in which it gives better results. If we eliminate
the exogenous variables from consideration, the equation system seems to
turn in a slightly better performance.
If, on the other hand, interest is in the turning points, there appears to
be no significant difference between the results given by the more and less
sophisticated procedures. The naïve model missed all true turning points
but never forecast a false one.. The multi-equation model predicted about
1JamesW. Knowles, "Relation of Structure and Assumptions to Purpose in Making
Economic Projections," Proceedingsof the Business and Economic Statistics Section
of the American Statistical Association, September1956,pp.7-23.
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two-thirds of the turning points, but called eight which did not occur.
About 12 per cent of all errors were at turning points, but if the exogenous
variables had been perfectly known, 19 per cent of the errors would be at
turning points, compared to 20 per cent for the naïve method. Since the
only improvement which the model provides at the turning points is
due to errors in forecasting the exogenous variables, we would invert
Theil's conclusion and say that the successes in the unconditional pre-
dictions must be due to the degree of failure achieved in predicting these
values.
These findings lead us to conclude that our own reluctance to invest
scarce funds in complex mathematical systems has been justified, just as it
has been in previous tests. Our conclusion is reinforced by Theil's observa-
tion that the model seems to produce a tendency toward consistent under-
estimation such that the predicted values, on the average, are about 70
per cent of the actual values. The errors in predicting the exogenous values
may be due to a tendency to avoid predicting large changes, or changes
in direction, on the theory that this is a more conservative or less "risky"
practice. We offer the suggestion because we have observed this psychology
in business and government forecasting in this country. If this is true,
better results might be achieved by concentrating on improving the pre-
diction of the exogenous variables rather than on formulating an elaborate
mathematical procedure for predicting the endogenous variables.
Our reluctance to accept Theil's appraisal of the accuracy of these fore-
casts can be traced mainly to the belief that each projection should be
evaluated in the light of how well it served the purpose for which it was
designed rather than by testing the degree to which actual events corre-
spond to the prediction. General economic projections used in government
policy-making are not forecasts, strictly speaking, since they are intended
to lead to decisions during the forecast period. The decisions may call for
program changes which alter the assumptions on which the projections
are based. For example, a projection indicating a deflationary tendency in
the coming year might result in policies which would check the implied
decline. Under these conditions, an evaluation of the forecast in terms of
its correspondence to observed events would be irrelevant and misleading.
The vital question is whether or not any alternative projection would have
provided a better basis for policy-making.
There are three tests of the quality of a prediction:
1. Were the projected quantities the best estimates which could be
derived from the assumptions used?
2. Would other assumptions have been more efficient or appropriate
for the particular prediction?
3. Since the prediction was stated in terms of and derived from
assumptions through the use of an economic model, was the model's
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structure the best one for the particular conditions surrounding the
prediction?2
Only the first of these tests has been applied by Theil. It would be in-
teresting to see what results he would get by applying the other two.
ON THE JOINT ECONOMIC COMMITTEE PROJECTIONS
Perhaps it would be useful to describe some of our experience at the
Joint Economic Committee. The first purpose of the staff projections is to
set forth for the Committee's evaluation the nature and magnitude of any
adjustments necessary to achieve the objectives of the Employment Act,
along with the implications for the economy if the adjustments are not
forthcoming. A second purpose is to provide a basis for an internally
consistent program aimed at achievement of the nation's major economic
goals. These purposes have led to the development of a highly aggregative
model, one containing none of the detailed industry-by-industry or
product-by-product "goals" which might be appropriate where there
exists detailed government direction of the day-to-day operations of the
economy. The statistical testing of our projections involves three readily
identifiable areas.
Evaluation of the Underlying Data. Through its Subcommittee on
Economic Statistics, the Joint Economic Committee has brought technical
comment and public expression to bear on the accuracy and adequacy of
the underlying statistical data. The Subcommittee has held hearings and
published reports itself and has also presented material before Congres-
sional committees concerned with appropriations for statistics and assisted
in the development of new statistical programs and techniques. Most of
these activities have been directed toward those statistics which underlie
all national economic projections.
Testing the Hypotheses. The particular purposes and structure of our
projections dictate a number of the procedures used and explain our
concern with the underlying statistics. The staff prepares a national
economic budget, showing projected incomes and expenditures for
government, business, and consumers. On the expenditure side, we rely
heavily upon budget plans for the government sector. In the business
sector, we use such series as the Department of Commerce—Securities
and Exchange Commission and McGraw—Hill surveys of business plans
for plant and equipment expenditures, the Dun and Bradstreet surveys of
businessmen's expectations (first made at the request of the Joint Economic
Committee in 1947), and the recently inaugurated Newsweek—National
Industrial Conference Board survey of capital appropriations. In the
2 See footnote 1. A projection should be appraised ex post in the light of the informa-
tion, framework of measurement, and analytical tools available ex ante. However,
innovations can be incorporated to determine whether their use would have produced
a better forecast.
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consumer sector, we use such materials as the field surveys of consumer
intentions and expectations, conducted by the University of Michigan
Survey Research Center for the Federal Reserve Board and other groups.
On the supply side, however, the staff has developed production
functions as a basis for computing a "potential" output of the economy
believed to be consistent with "maximum employment, production, and
purchasing power."3 The published estimates are derived from trends in
labor force, employment, hours of work, and output per man-hour—in
government, agriculture, and total private nonagricultural activity. Up to
now data problems have precluded use of more complex models. We look
forward to development of usable production models that take into con-
sideration both capital and labor inputs, with allowance for such influences
as the ratio of output to capacity, and changes in product mix, in hours of
work, in the age distribution of the capital stock, and in technology.
Usefulness of the Projections. The regular examination of the value of
the projections for policy-making is another important feature of our
testing procedure. In the Committee's report on the 1956 Economic Report
of the President, the staff presented an estimate of the potential output
(supply) for 1956, made at the beginning of the year, of $327.4 billion
in 1947 prices. In February 1957, actual GNP for 1956 in 1947 prices
was estimated at $330.4 billion. Actual demand, therefore, was $3.0
billion or about 0.9 per cent above the advance estimate of potential
output.
How could this difference be accounted for in terms of employment,
hours of work, and productivity? First, employment exceeded the assumed
long-term trend. The labor force increased 1.5 million compared to an
average increase of 800,000 to 900,000 per year, while unemployment was
3.8 per cent rather than the assumed 4 per cent. This could account for
an excess of output over potential of about $4.3 billion. Hours of work,
slightly longer than previous trends indicated, accounted for an excess of
output of $2.7 billion. Finally, output per man-hour in the private non-
farm sector apparently failed to increase in 1956. This resulted in output
falling $4.0 billion below the level possible if output per man-hour had
reached the trend value as then estimated, demonstrating the difficulty in
using year-to-year movements of this ratio—especially when such pre-
liminary data are used as a basis for forecasting.
The staff also estimated that the January 1956 Economic Report and the
budget implied a demand for gross national product in 1956 of $400 billion,
in fourth quarter of 1955 prices. Before being compared with the actual
figure for 1956, this figure must be raised by about 1 per cent ($3.7 billion)
to allow for revisions in July 1956 of the 1955 basic statistical data from
3SeePotentialEconomic Growth of the United States during the Next Decade, Materials
prepared for the Joint Economic Committee by the Committee Staff, Joint Committee
Print, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 1954.
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which the projections were made. It must also be raised by about 2.3 per
cent ($9.3 billion) to allow for price increases in 1956. Combined, the
adjustments increase the assumed GNP for 1956 to $413.0 billion. The
figure reported in the fall of 1957 was $412.4 billion, $0.6 billion or less
than 0.2 per cent below the estimate. The difference is negligible since it is
far smaller than what may result from later revisions of the now available
data for
The shortcoming of the analysis as a basis for policy in 1956 was the
failure to place sufficient emphasis on the prospects for continued price
rises, although the analysis of the 1956 Economic Report pointed out that
some experts anticipated these. And about six weeks later, on April 18,
1956, in a memorandum to the Committee, the staff stressed the inflation-
ary aspects of the situation. But this discussion illustrates an advantage of
the projections—they are published in a quantitative form with enough
detail and statement of assumptions to make possible later testing in the
light of events.
Our experience with the use of forecasts of various types for policy
decisions in both business and government suggests that the essential
theoretical problem is that of specifying the characteristics required for a
particular type of decision in a particular set of historical circumstances.
Furthermore, in practical circumstances one cannot ignore the probability
that the functional relationships between the instruments and the uncon-
trolled variables may vary according to the specific conditions which
require a decision. It is not clear that the existing body of theory, including
the interesting contribution by Theil, provides a suitable framework for
laying out the specifications for the required predictions and for the
analytical structures in which they are to be used in reaching the decisions.
REPLY BY MR. THEIL
Replying to Lehman's and Knowles' comments, I shall confine myself
to the following points:
1. Predicted percentage changes were defined as deviates from the
previous year's levels as these were known at the moment of prediction.
This was done because the equation system yields estimates of relative
changes, not of (absolute) levels. The prediction of next year's level is
obtained by adding the predicted change to the available estimate of the
previous year's level. Any adjustment of the forecast for estimated effects
of predicted changes in policies resulting from the forecast (cf. point 5 of
the Comment) is highly uncertain and dubious. But it seems plausible
that it would in general ameliorate rather than deteriorate the quality of
the forecasts.
Sincethis was written, the Department of Commerce has revised its estimate of
GNP for 1956 to $419.2 billion.
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2. It is not correct to say that the model produces a tendency toward
consistent underestimation of changes. This tendency is produced, not by
the model itself, but by the underestimation of changes in exogenous
variables (see pages 34 to 35 of my paper).
3. As to the comparison with "naïve" forecasting models, the passage
where Lehman and Knowles stated that in about 20 per cent of all cases
the model is as effective as the naïve method, the remaining 80 per cent
being fairly evenly distributed over more favorable and less favorable
cases, is not fully clear to me. I thought that the picture of Charts 1, 2,
and 3 was sufficiently clear, but for the sake of completeness I present a
table containing the mean absolute extrapolation error (i.e. the average of
A_1 —A,disregarding signs) and the mean absolute forecasting error, both
for the unconditional forecasts and for the conditional ones. The data for
the former forecasts are derived from Table 1 of my paper. It is clear
that four variables are better predicted by the naïve forecasts than by
the unconditional forecasts, that the opposite is true for eighteen vari-
ables, and that there is one case of a tie; further, that the mean absolute
forecasting error is less than one-half of the mean absolute extrapolation
error in seven cases. As is to be expected, the conditional forecasts show
a still better picture: the median ratio of the mean absolute forecasting
error to the mean absolute extrapolation error over all fourteen variables
is about a third. See table on page 52.
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Mean Absolute Comparisonof
Errorof Mean Absolute Errors
Variables Extra-Fore-(1)<(2)(1)>(2)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
UNCONDITIONAL
Price indexes:
Commodity exports 8.9 3.6 *
Commodityimports 9.6 1.0 * *
Consumption 2.2 2.2 tie tie
Quantities and volumes:
Commodity exports 8.6 11.3 *
Commodityimports 19.0 8.2 * *
Consumption 2.5 1.7 *
Industrialproduction 8.1 5.0
Construction activity 16.3 3.0 * *
Availablelabor force 1.0 0.6 *
Laborproductivity 3.5 2.0 a
Employment in private sector 1.9 1.2 *
Employmentin public sector 5.1 1.9 a *
Moneyvalues:
Commodity exports 3.5 7.6 *
Commodityimports 21.0 8.7 * *
Consumption 3.6 2.1 a
Netinvestment (mci. inventories) 67.0 25.7 0
Valueadded in private sector 3.2 5.6
Government wage bill 7.2 5.4 *
Governmentcommodity purchases 8.8 10.8 *
Indirecttaxes minus subsidies 13.7 3.0 a *
Exportsof services 15.2 13.8 *
Importsof services 18.2 13.7
Surplus on the balance of services 25.4 14.4
Number of cases 4+ 1 8
CONDITIONAL FORECASTSb
Price indexes:
Commodity exports 11.4 2.9 * a
Consumption 4.0 3.0 *
Investmentgoods 8.6 3.2 * S
Inventories 13.0 2.0 * a
Governmentcommodity purchases 8.4 3.1 * *
Quantitiesand volumes:
Commodity imports 21.2 4.3 *
Consumption 2.1 2.9
Gross fixed investment 10.4 2.3 * I
Grossnational product 5.4 1.8 *
Employmentin private sector 1.4 0.7 *
Moneyvalues:
Indirect taxes minus subsidies 15.8 2.6 * 0
Incometaxes paid by wage-earners 4.5 1.6 a a
Incometaxes paid by others 11.7 3.8 * *
Nonwageincome 4.0 3.8 a
Numberof cases 1 13 10
a 1949-51 and 1953-55.
b 1950-54 (1949 is omitted because some of the actual changes in 1948 are not available).
52